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A B S T R A C T
We show that investments in public goods change the optimal land use in their vicinity, leading to additional
welfare benefits. This occurs through two sorting mechanisms. First, availability of public goods leads to higher
population densities. Second, population groups sort according to their preferences for public goods. We develop
a structural spatial general equilibrium model that accounts for these effects. The model is estimated using data
on transport infrastructure, commuting behaviour, land use and land rents for some 3000 ZIP-codes in the
Netherlands and for three levels of education. Welfare benefits of investments in public transport infrastructure
are shown to differ sharply by workers’ educational attainment. Welfare gains from changes in land use account
for up to 30% of the total benefits of a transport investment.
1. Introduction
House prices are routinely used to value welfare benefits from local
public goods, like transport infrastructure, central business districts,
and shopping malls. Although this is common practice, it raises two
important issues. First, the supply and the use of housing are en-
dogenous. Land close to valuable public goods is likely to be scarce and
therefore commands a higher rent. This raises the density of construc-
tion per square meter of land and leads to a more intensive use of ex-
isting construction. Second, people are likely to differ in their pre-
ferences for living close to local public goods. This leads to spatial
sorting, where people with a greater willingness to pay for the proxi-
mity to public goods will live closer to them. This will again affect the
land rents and the land use. A proper model for the valuation of public
goods should account for this ’double sorting’ on density and hetero-
geneous preferences, and for the changes in optimal land use. Figs. 1
and 2 illustrate the importance of the two mechanisms for the Neth-
erlands. Fig. 1 shows that land rents vary by almost a factor 400, ran-
ging from 3800 euro per square meter in Amsterdam’s Canal Zone to
some 10 euro along the North-Eastern border with Germany. Fig. 2
documents that places with high land rents have high population
densities (left panel). It also shows the spatial segregation in residential
location between high and low educated workers (right panel). Roughly
speaking, the high educated live in the cities where land rents peak,
while low educated live in the countryside.
This paper develops a spatial general equilibrium model that allows
the valuation of local public goods accounting for both mechanisms:
changes in population density and heterogeneous preferences for local
public goods. Changes in the supply of public goods lead in the model to
a new equilibrium on the market for residential land. The underlying
mechanisms include endogenous responses in home and work locations
and modal choice of individuals, in land prices and population density.
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We estimate the parameters using detailed microdata for the
Netherlands.
The model is applied to a hypothetical policy experiment. We con-
sider the welfare implications of a better railway connection between
an economic centre and its periphery. This improved connection leads
to a shift in the modal split from car to train and to a relocation of jobs
from the periphery to the more productive centre. Indeed, as more
people are willing to commute to the centre, the labour supply in the
centre increases and so does the number of jobs. The periphery loses
jobs, but becomes a more attractive residential location due to a better
accessibility of the centre. Land use intensity and land prices rise,
especially in locations close to railway stations. Population increases
there, and the population composition shifts towards high educated
workers as they attach a relatively high value to railway connections
and the accessibility of jobs in the economic centre.
Our model extends the classical McFadden’s random utility frame-
work. This framework is frequently applied to recover heterogeneous
preferences for local public goods and to value welfare benefits from
discrete changes in these goods (see Epple and Sieg, 1999, Bayer et al.,
2004, Bayer et al., 2007, Bayer et al., 2009, and Klaiber and
Kuminoff, 2014). Our main extension is to model individual housing
and land consumption explicitly. In our model, consumers optimally
choose their residential location and the amounts of housing and other
consumption of goods. We show that the choice of the consumption
bundle reduces to the choice between land and other consumption
given the local land rent and supply of public goods. Changes in the
supply of local public goods shift the residential demand in a location
outwards. This leads to higher rents, more intensive land use, and hence
to higher housing and population densities. One can think of this pro-
cess either as a more intensive use of the existing supply of housing, e.g.
by splitting or merging apartments, or as a gradual reconstruction of a
neighbourhood after the land rent has changed. Most existing equili-
brium sorting models (Klaiber and Phaneuf, 2010; Tra, 2010; Sieg et al.,
2002, Sieg et al., 2004) work with an equilibrium in housing services,
holding housing supply constant. In these models changes in the supply
of public goods affect housing prices and population composition, but
not population density. Walsh (2007) includes the effects of public
goods on land consumption in a spatial equilibrium setting. His way of
modelling the preference heterogeneity is, however, based on a single
amenity index. We apply a more flexible approach of modelling the
preference for each public good explicitly. Furthermore, we allow for a
non-constant elasticity of substitution between land and other con-
sumption and estimate from the data the share of land in consumption.
As another extension we incorporate a separate home location, job
location and commuting mode choice decisions in the model. This al-
lows us to carry out a welfare analysis of concrete transportation im-
provements such as for example a better railway connection between
the centre and its periphery.
To estimate the heterogeneity of preferences for home location, job
location and commuting mode we use microdata on some 60,000 Dutch
employees of three education levels. We know the home and job loca-
tion of these employees on the level of a four digit zip code, an area that
in cities covers approximately one square kilometer. We also know
which transportation mode the employees use for commuting. This
dataset is enriched with information about land prices and amenities in
the home zip codes, and travel time and cost characteristics of trips for
all possible combinations of home and job locations. Variation in the
location characteristics between zip codes and variation in trip char-
acteristics between commuting modes are used to estimate the para-
meters of the consumer choice model. To estimate the share of land in
consumption we use variation in land prices, residential land use and
total wage income by zip code.
Our structural estimates provide a number of interesting insights.
First, we find the elasticity of substitution between land and other
consumption to be around 0.7. This result is roughly in line with











































Fig. 1. Land rents (log) in the Netherlands.
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Fig. 2. Population density (left) and share of high educated residents by zip code (right).
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Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) who report the elasticity of substitution
between land and the value of construction to be about a half for the
US. Since the elasticity is smaller than unity, the land share in con-
sumption is increasing in the degree of agglomeration in the economy.
Landlords are therefore the main beneficiaries of agglomeration. The
land share varies from 6% in peripheral areas to almost 50% in the most
expensive locations. Second, the preferences for local public goods
differ widely across levels of education. Third, population groups sig-
nificantly differ in their land consumption with high educated having a
larger willingness to pay for residential space than low educated.1 This
has interesting policy implications. Investing in local public goods in-
creases residential demand for a location, especially of high educated.
To maximize the welfare benefits of new public goods, it is efficient that
the high educated move to their vicinity. This requires, however, ad-
justments in the housing supply, as high educated have different land
consumption preferences than other groups. In other words, invest-
ments in local public goods should optimally go together with re-
development of the housing stock.
Our hypothetical policy experiment – closing down the railway
connection between the city of Amsterdam and the area North of the
city - illustrates the effect of spatial sorting and shifts in the intensity
of land use. We show that 30% of the welfare benefits are due to
relocation of people to other home and job locations; the other 70%
are time savings of consumers who do not relocate. High skilled re-
locate relatively more and they get the major part (70%) of the total
benefits. These results have important political economy implica-
tions. Investments in long-distance transportation benefit especially
the high skilled. This result arises in our model through two channels:
(i) high educated can gain relatively more in terms of wages by
commuting longer distances; (ii) high educated are less sensitive than
other groups to changes in land rents. Finally, the welfare gains from
the new railway connection are divided between land owners and
workers. Due to the impossibility of price discrimination, land
owners cannot capture the whole gain (see also Kuminoff and Pope,
2014)2.
This paper links to two main strands of papers in the literature. The
first strand studies how population size and density in different re-
sidential locations are affected by the public goods supply.
Albouy (2009) shows that existing federal taxes induce population
shifts from urban to rural areas. Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013) use
a general equilibrium model to explain the city size distribution from
differences in congestion costs, amenities and productivity.
Ahlfeldt et al. (2016) model the changes in residential density and land
prices in Berlin. Diamond (2016) simulates sorting of high and low
skilled between cities. The second strand focuses on the effect of in-
vestments in transportation. Haughwout (2002) develops a spatial
model with aggregate investment in regional transport infrastructure.
Anas and Liu (2007) model the interaction between land use and
transportation infrastructure. Baum-Snow (2007) and Allen and
Arkolakis (2014) analyze the effect of the highway system in the USA.
Duranton and Turner (2012) estimate a model explaining the joint
evolution of highways and employment. Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001),
Gibbons and Machin (2005), and Klaiber and Smith (2010) examine the
effects of infrastructure investments on house prices. Baum-Snow and
Kahn (2000) address changes in the modal shift.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 derives the in-
direct utility function of consumers and defines the equilibrium on the
land market. Section 3 deals with identification issues in the structural
estimation. Section 4 discusses the data and Section 5 the estimation




We consider an economy with I individuals i. Each individual is
endowed with an education level s: low, middle or high. The economy
is made up of H locations, that are either indexed h for the home lo-
cation of an individual, or j for her job location. Each individual has
exactly one job. Within each location h, there are Kh houses. Individuals
choose to live in one of the houses k∈ Kh×H; hence, by choosing a
house k, an individual implicitly chooses to live in the home location h
where that house is located. Individuals also choose job location j.
Finally, they must choose a mode of transport m: car, train, other public
transport, or walking/cycling. It is convenient to define the combina-
tion of these three choices for a house, a job location, and a mode of
transport as one vector: x≡ {k, j, m}. All three choices are discrete
choices from a finite set of alternatives. While the set of regions H in the
economy is exogenously given, the number of houses Kh at location h is
determined endogenously.
The take-home pay of individual i is given by
= −W x W e( ) ,i s w j c x( ) ( )s i
where Ws is the nationwide mean wage for education level s, ws(j) is the
relative deviation from the nationwide mean for education level s at job
location j, and ci(x) is the generalized commuting cost relative to labour
income. Hence, the wage for education level s varies between job lo-
cations. The commuting cost ci(x) depends on the house, the job loca-
tion and mode of transport for commuting, that is, it depends on all
elements of x. Commuting cost is modelled as an iceberg technology
where commuting depletes a fraction of the wage. The cost ci(x) differs
between individuals due to individual-specific factors.
Individuals are characterized by a homothetic constant returns to
scale utility function3 with the consumption of housing services F and
other consumption C as its arguments:
=U F C x U F C e( , ; ) ( , ) ,i χ x( )i
where the function U(·) is twice differentiable and satisfies the standard
slope and curvature assumptions. Note that the function χi(x) is allowed
to differ between individuals; on the contrary, the function U(F, C) is
the same for all i.
Let Ph(F) be the price of a house that offers F housing services at
residential location h. House prices differ across residential locations h,
while the price of other consumption is the same across all locations in
the economy. Without loss of generality, the price of other consumption
is normalized to unity. Individuals choose F, C, and x as to maximize
their utility subject to their budget constraint:
= +W x P F C( ) ( ) .i h
Housing services are produced by real estate developers by means of
a constant returns to scale production function =F F L B( , ) with the lot
size L and the units of building B installed upon that lot as its inputs.
Like the utility function, the production function is twice differentiable
and satisfies standard assumptions. Each location h has an exogenously
fixed supply of land Ah available for residential use. This land is most
easily thought of as being owned by a class of absentee landlords, who
maximize their income. Developers can choose how much land to buy
from landowners and how much building to construct on that land.
They make these choices as to maximize their profits. Perfect
1 Though our utility function is homothetic, we allow for differences in the utility
function across levels of education. Since education is correlated to income, this yields
outcomes that are comparable to a non-homothetic utility function. However, actually
applying a non-homothetic utility function would greatly complicate the analysis.
2 In Fig. 1, log rents are normalized at 0 in Enschede with an average land price of 109
euro/m2.
3 Since a utility function is invariant to an increasing transformation, the concept of
constant returns to scale has little meaning in this context. However, when using the
indirect utility function, see Eq. (1) below, this assumption implies that the level of utility
is linear in income. This simplifies notation.
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competition on the market for real estate development drives their
profits down to zero. We assume that the land within a location h is
homogeneous. Perfect competition on the land market yields a market
clearing price Rh that sets the demand for that land equal to its exo-
genous supply Ah. The price of one unit of building B is the same across
locations, which is again normalized to unity without loss of generality.
These assumptions guarantee that the price for a house charged by
developers at location h is equal to the cost of production of that house
(see also Muth, 1969):
= +P F L B R L B[ ( , )] .h h
This formulation allows us to integrate the profit maximization problem
of real estate developers and the utility maximization problem of in-
dividuals into a single unified problem. The individual chooses her
optimal land use L*, the units of building B*, her expenditure on other
consumption C*, and her choice set x as to maximize her utility subject
to her budget constraint;
=
= + +
L B C x U F L B C e
W x R L B C
{ *, *, *, *} arg max [ ( , ), ] ,
subject to : ( ) .
i i i i






This reduced-form specification of the utility function encompasses the
production function of housing services. It takes into account that in a
perfectly competitive housing market, real estate developers will only
develop houses that provide services to individuals in the most cost-
effective way. This reduced form utility function does not have housing
services F as its argument, but the inputs L and B that are required for
the production of F.
2.2. Indirect utility function
The optimal demand for land L*, for units of construction B*, and
other consumption C* for an individual who chooses to live in a house
in location h are all a function of the land price Rh in that location. For
instance, for L* we obtain (see Appendix A):
= − ′L R x v R W x* ( ; ) ( ) ( ),i h h i (2)
where ̂≡v R U F L R B R C R( ) ln [ [ *( ), *( )], *( )].h h h h The prices for B* and
C* drop out, since they are equal for all regions (and normalized to
unity). Substituting these individual demand functions back into the
direct utility function yields the indirect utility function. This indirect
utility function Vi(Rh; x) takes the following convenient log additive
form, see Appendix A for the derivation:
≡ + −
= + + −
V R x U F L B C χ x w j c x W
v R χ x w j c x W
( ; ) [ ( *, *), *]exp[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
exp[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ,
i h i s i s
h i s i s (3)
The factor Ws is just an exogenous constant that is irrelevant for the
actual choices of the individual. The term in square brackets is the
driving force. It consists of four components, those measuring the effect
of respectively: (i) the land rents v(Rh); (ii) home and job location
specific factors χi(x); (iii) the wage surplus ws(j); (iv) commuting cost
ci(x). These components are specified as follows:
= − +
= ′ + + +
=
= ′ −
v R ρ R ψR
χ x μ α a z μ
w j μ μ y
c x μ μ μ γ c
( ) (ln ),
( ) ( ɛ ɛ ),
( ) ,
( ) ( ɛ ),
͠ ͠
h h h
i Ks s h h ik Js ikj
s Ks Js sj
i Ks Js Ms s shjm ikjm (4)


































where we omit the irrelevant additive constant lnWs. This recursive
specification of the indirect utility function, where the term capturing
the effect of the commuting mode m is embedded in a broader term
capturing the effect of job location j, which is in turn embedded in the
overall utility of the house k in residential location h, implies a nested
logit structure for the choice of the finite set {x} (see Ben-Akiva and
Lerman, 1985). Each term in this utility function is explained below,
where we work our way back from the final term on commuting, to the
term on job location, to the overall utility for a house k.
The term = ′ −c x μ μ μ γ c( ) ( ɛ )i Ks Js Ms s shjm ikjm reflects the commuting
cost between h and j by mode m. It includes both a deterministic part
′γ cs shjm and a stochastic part εikjm, capturing heterogeneity in individual
preferences unobservable to the researcher and that is specific to each
combination =x k j m{ , , }; εikjm follows a type I extreme value dis-
tribution, see Appendix B for details. The vector cshjm covers the ob-
servable characteristics of the trip, like financial cost as share of in-
come, travel time, convenience, and post- and pre-transport for
commuting by train.
Commuting cost relative to income ci(x) enters the log indirect
utility function (3) linearly with a coefficient equal to unity. Since the
vector cshjm includes the financial cost of commuting relative to income,
our specification yields a restriction on the parameter for the corre-
sponding element of γs. Let γs0 denote this element. Hence, for the fi-
nancial cost of commuting relative to income to enter linearly with
coefficient unity, the following restriction must hold:
=μ μ μ γ 1.Ks Js Ms s0 (6)
We refer to Eq. (6) as the transport cost identity. The economic intuition
for this constraint is as follows. The commuting cost enters the budget
constraint through = −W x W e( )i s w j c x( ) ( )s i . An individual must be in-
different between losing one percent of income either via a lower wage
ws(j) or via higher commuting cost. Since both ws(j) and cshjm0 measure
the effect on the take home pay relative to the average wage Ws, the
coefficient on cshjm0 must be equal to unity. Eq. (6) achieves just that.
Working our way back, the commuting cost term is embedded in a
more general term for utility derived from the job location. It consists of
the job location fixed effect ysj that captures, among other things, the
relative wage surplus ws(j) at work location j for education level s. One
could extend the model by allowing for other job location fixed effects.
Since neither relative wages, nor other job location fixed effects are
observed, we are unable to disentangle both. Hence, adding these ef-
fects would not change the empirical content of the model. Again, ɛ͠ikj is
a random individual component specific to each combination {k, j}
reflecting unobserved differences in preferences for job locations, see
Appendix B for its distribution.
Working our way one step further back, the specification of the
function χi(x) also includes both a deterministic and a stochastic part.
Apart from the effect of the local land rent in the first term to be dis-
cussed below, there are two deterministic terms. First, the vector ah
measures the observed amenities at location h, like the scenery in the
neighbourhood, the number of monuments, and the availability of
restaurants and shops. Second, the term zh is a fixed location effect,
which is assumed to be uncorrelated to ah. These variables are constant
across all houses k at location h. Finally, the term ɛ͠ik is a random effect
to each house k at location h, reflecting individual differences in pre-
ferences for a specific house k, see again Appendix B for its distribution.
Finally, we have the land rent function v(Rh). For =ψ 0, we obtain
= −v R ρ R( ) ln ,h h which is the Cobb Douglas specification with the
parameter ρ measuring the land share in total expenditure. The choice
of the functional form of the second term of v(Rh) is just a matter of
convenience. For example, the translog cost function applies a second




that case. In principle, one can apply any functional form for v( · ) that
satisfies the curvature assumptions, v′(Rh) < 0 and v′′(Rh) > v′(Rh)2.
For example, one can fit a non-parametric function. The specification
proposed here brings the advantage of its simplicity and it fits the data
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on land use well, as we show in the empirical part of the paper. The








(1 )(1 (1 ))
,h
h h (7)
see Appendix A for the derivation. For ψ > 0, the elasticity of sub-
stitution is less than unity and hence the share of land is increasing in its
price Rh.
Note that all parameters in the specification of Eq. (5) are allowed to
vary between levels of education, except for the home location fixed
effect zh and the parameters ρ and ψ of the land rent function v(Rh). The
observed amenities ′α as h are likely to absorb most of the differences in
preferences for various residential locations between levels of educa-
tion. Hence, assuming zh to be equal across levels of education is a
justifiable restriction. Regarding ρ and ψ: since we do not have data on
land use by level of education, ρ and ψ cannot be separately identified
for each level of education. Hence, we constrain them to be equal across
education levels.
2.3. Optimal choice of home and job location, commuting mode
The individual chooses her house, her work location and the com-
muting mode, =x k j m{ , , }, as to maximize her utility. The recursive
structure of the indirect utility function ln Vi(Rh; x) in Eq. (5) allows us
to solve this utility maximization problem in three sequential steps, by
backward induction. First, we solve for the optimal choice of com-
muting mode m *i conditional on the residential and job location {k, j}.
Next, we use these results to solve for the optimal job location j*i
conditional on housing choice k. Then we use the expression for the
optimal job location choice to analyze the optimal choice of the house
k *,i and thereby the residential location h *i .
2.3.1. Choice of commuting mode
Since only the last term of utility function (5) depends on m, the
optimal choice of m minimizes the commuting cost, taking k and j as
given. Hence, the individual chooses m as to maximize
= − ′ +m γ c* arg max[ ɛ ].i
m s
shjm ikjm
Since εikjm takes a standard type I extreme value distribution, the
probability that individual i chooses commuting mode m conditional on




























The variable − cshj is the standard logsum in a logit model: a measure of
the expected generalized commuting cost between the residential lo-
cation h and the job location j for an individual with education level s.
2.3.2. Choice of job location
Substituting the expression for the generalized cost of the optimal
commuting mode − ′ +γ cmax [ ɛ ]m s shjm ikjm in the utility function (5) and
using Eqs. (25) and (26) from Appendix B yields an expression for
utility conditional on the optimal commuting mode:
= + ′ + +
+ − +
V R k j m v R μ α a z
μ y μ c
ln ( ; , , ) ( ) [ ɛ
( ɛ )].
͠i h i h Ks s h h ik
Js sj Ms shj ikj
*
(9)
Since j enters only via the last term of this indirect utility function, the
individual chooses j as to maximize that last term:
= − +j y μ c* arg max[ ɛ ].i j sj Ms shj ikj
Since εikj follows a type I extreme value distribution, see Appendix B,











= + ′ + + +
∈
j j k s
y μ c
g
g y μ c
V R k j m v R μ α a z μ g




ln exp( ) ,







i h i i h Ks s h h Js sh ik
* *
(10)
where we use Eqs. (25) and (26) from Appendix B in the final line. The
variable gsh measures the option value of finding a job for somebody
living in location h. The logsum gsh is therefore a generalized job at-
tractivity measure for residential location h.
2.3.3. Choice of home location
Again, consider the utility function in Eq. (10). The individual
chooses the house k as to maximize
= +
≡ + ′ + +−
k v
v μ v R α a z μ g





sh Ks h s h h Js sh
1
(11)
The choice of a house k implies the choice for a residential location h.
Hence, we obtain again a logit model:
∑
∑














h h s k k
v N
v
v v N v

















where Nh is the number of houses in location h. Eq. (12) yields a simple
expression for expected log utility:
=V R x s μ vE[ln ( ; *) ] .i h i Ks s (13)
Why do we go through the complication of distinguishing between
individual houses k within each residential location h? The reason is
that if we fail to do so, the utility of an individual location would de-
pend on the actual classification of the country as a whole into different
locations (see also Lerman and Kern, 1983). To see this, consider the
probability of choosing either of two neighbouring locations, h1 and h2,
with exactly the same amenities ah and the same location fixed effect zh
in a model that ignores the variety of houses within a particular loca-
tion.4 It would satisfy Eq. (13), but now without the term lnNh:
= ∨ =
+
= =h h h s
v v
v
h h sPr[ * ]







Suppose the National Bureau of Statistics were to decide arbitrarily to
merge both locations into one location h, = =R R Rh h h1 2 and
= =v v vsh sh sh1 2. Then, this specification implies that the probability
= ∨h h h sPr[ * ]i 1 2 would drop by a factor 2. By allowing individuals to
choose between houses k instead of residential locations h, the term
lnNh enters the specification vsh, which exactly offsets the effect of
merging both locations. Hence, the probabilities become independent
of the actual classification in locations. By acknowledging that each
individual house is slightly different from the perspective of an in-
dividual buyer, we account for the fact that by doubling the number of
houses in a particular subset Kh, the probability that an individual
chooses a house in that subset also doubles, if we keep all observable
differences constant.
2.4. Land rents and sorting
A simple transformation of the probability h sPr[ ] allows an in-
sightful analysis of the land rents. First rewrite Eq. (12), using the
4 Note that the argumentation below only holds if zh in both locations are the same.
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definition of ≡ + ′ + +−v μ v R α a z μ g( )sh Ks h s h h Js sh
1 :
= + ′ + + + −−h s μ v R α a z μ g N vPr[ ] exp[ ( ) ln ],Ks h s h h Js sh h s
1 (14)
Applying the Bayes’ rule and a log transformation, substituting hPr[ ]
and sPr[ ] for their observed values Nh/N and Ns/N and bringing μJsgsh to
the left hand side, we obtain:5
− = + + ′ +−s h μ g v μ v R α a zln Pr[ ] ( ) .Js sh s Ks h s h h
1 (15)
where ≡vs −N vln .s s Since − v R( )h is an increasing function of Rh,
Eq. (15) can be solved for ln Rh. In general, the inverse function has no
explicit analytical expression, except for the Cobb Douglas case where
=ψ 0 and where the inverse function simplifies to − =v R ρ R( ) lnh h.
Though the subsequent argument applies for any admissible ≠ψ 0, we
focus on this Cobb Douglas case for the sake of transparency. Then, the
solution for ln Rh reads
=
+ ′ + + −
−R





s s h h Js sh
Ks
1 (16)
Ignoring the term − s hln Pr[ ] for the moment, this equation is a stan-
dard log linear land rent equation: land rents are increasing in observed
and unobserved amenities, ′ +α a z ,s h h and in the job availability gsh.
Note that the parameters of this equation and the job availability in-
dicator gsh differ between levels of education s. This seems to yield an
inconsistency: though the left hand side does not depend on s, the right
hand side does. We reframe this paradox in economic terms: how can a
unified land market at each location h for all levels of education be
consistent with education level specific returns to amenities? This
paradox is resolved by the term s hln Pr[ ]. Take the higher education
level =s 3 as a point of reference for our argument. When location h is
predominantly inhabited by high educated workers, = →s hPr[ 3 ] 1, it
must be the case that the observed characteristics of location h are more
attractive for higher than for middle or low-educated workers; in terms
of our model: ≫ =v v ,h sh s3 , 1,2 see Eq. (12). Hence, there is little sorting
along unobserved preferences εik. This is reflected by the term s hln Pr[ ]:
since = →s hPr[ 3 ] 1, = →s hln Pr[ 3 ] 0, and the log land rent equation
simplifies to
=
+ ′ + +
−R
v α a z μ g
ρμ
ln .h
h h J h
K
3 3 3 3
3
1
Land rent gradients correspond to the preferences of the higher edu-
cated.
Next, consider the case that location h is predominantly inhabited
by low-educated workers, =s 1; hence, = →s hPr[ 1 ] 1 and hence
= →s hPr[ 3 ] 0, or equivalently ≫ =v vh sh s1 , 2,3. Hence, only higher
educated with a strong unobserved preference εik for a house at that
location will live in location h. There is therefore strong positive sorting
on unobservables. The lower =s hPr[ 3 ], the stronger the positive
sorting, which is captured by the term =s hln Pr[ 3 ]. Since
= + +∈s h v v v vPr[ ] exp( )/Σ exp( ),sh s l S lh l
= → + − −s h v v v vPr[ 3 ] exp( )h h3 3 1 1 .6,7 Substitution of this expression
for =s hln Pr[ 3 ] in Eq. (16) yields
=
+ ′ + + − + − −
=




v α a z μ g v v v v
ρμ






h h J h h h
K
h h J h
K
3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
3
1
1 1 1 1
1
1
In this case, land rent gradients correspond to the preferences of the low
educated.
Hence, what education level’s s returns to amenities apply in a
particular region depends on what level of education is predominant
among the population there. If a location is mainly inhabited by high
educated workers, then this education level’s returns prevail. This
conclusion has important implications for the cost benefit analysis of
investments in transport infrastructure and other public goods. These
investments have the highest return in those locations that are pre-
dominantly inhabited by people with a strong preference for these
public goods. For example, a location close to a railway station attracts
predominantly higher educated workers, who use the train more often,
as we shall see in Section 6. This pushes the local land gradient towards
the preferences of higher educated workers, making further speciali-
zation of amenities in favour of higher educated workers at that loca-
tion more attractive.
2.5. Land market equilibrium
The model is closed by the constraint that the supply of residential
land at location h, Ah, must be larger or equal to the demand. The de-
mand can be calculated as the total number of workers with education
level s, denoted Ns, times the probability that a person with education s
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where we use the expression for the optimal land consumption (2) in
the second line.
In a market equilibrium, the above conditions are binding. Other
things equal, the right hand side depends negatively on Rh by two
mechanisms: first, the number of individuals that prefer a house at that
location decreases, and second, the average lot size E L h s[ * , ]i at that
location becomes smaller when Rh increases. Land rents adjust till the
supply and demand for land at each location are equal.
Finally, the number of houses at location h must be equal to the
number of people who choose to locate there. Hence
∑= =
∈




where Nh is the number of houses that developers choose to construct at
location h (the number of elements in the set Kh). The number of houses
at location h adjusts such that conditional on the average lot size
E L h s[ * , ],i all available residential land Ah is used for residential con-
struction, see Eq. (17).
An equilibrium is a set of land rents Rh and a set of number of houses
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Substituting hPr[ ] and sPr[ ] for their observed values Nh/N and Ns/N and cancelling
common terms, obtain (15).
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7 This follows from
(footnote continued)
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where we substitute = = + +∈s h v v v vPr[ 3 ] exp( )/Σ exp( )h l S lh l3 3 in the second step.
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3. Identification and estimation
Now that we have analysed the individual behaviour and the market
equilibrium, the discussion of the identification of the model’s para-
meters is relatively straightforward. Table 1 presents an overview. Each
line of the table refers to one component of the estimation procedure.
For each component, the table shows the relevant equation, the para-
meters that are estimated, the required inputs, and the outputs that are
used in subsequent steps of the estimation. Lines 1–5 of the table
identify all parameters of the utility function (5).8 Line 6 provides over-
identifying restrictions.
Line 1 of Table 1 estimates the land share in total expenditure. By
taking expectations over s in Eq. (2), substituting (4) for v′(Rh), and
multiplying the expected individual land use with the number of re-
sidents in h, Nh, we obtain
= + −N L h s ρ ψR R WE[ * , ] (1 ) .h i h h h1
where Wh is the total wage income in residential location h minus
commuting cost.9 Since the land availability constraint is binding in the
market equilibrium, the total land use across all levels of education in
location h must be equal to the endowment of land at location h, Ah:
=A N L h sE[ * , ].h h i
Combining these results yields:
= + +A R
W
ρ ψR ζ(1 ) ,h h
h
h h (19)
where ζh is an error term capturing unexplained variation in the land
use. Eq. (19) has an intuitive interpretation as it contains on both sides
the average income share of land in location h.
Eq. (19) can be estimated with OLS, yielding the parameter values
for ρ and ψ. These values enter the land rent function v(Rh), which will
serve as an input for the estimation of the home location choice logit in
line 4 of Table 1. However, Eq. (19) might suffer from the presence of
measurement error in the data on Rh, as it includes Rh on both sides. To
study the importance of this problem we will also estimate an alter-
native specification:
= + +− −A W ρ ψR R ς(1 ) .h h h h h
1 1 (20)
The logit for modal split (Table 1, line 2) can be estimated from
individual data on trip characteristics cshjm and the actual choices of
commuting mode. This yields estimates for the modal split parameters
γs. These parameters can be applied for the calculation of the transport
logsum − c ,shj a generalized measure of commuting cost between job
location j and residential location h. This measure is then used as an
input in the logit of job location choice (Table 1, line 3). The job
location logit yields estimates for the scaling parameter μMs and the
fixed effects ysj for each job location j. The estimation results can be
used for the calculation of the job availability measure gsh that serves as
an input in the logit for the residential location.
The estimation of the logit for residential location is more involved,
since the land rent Rh is endogenous. The endogeneity problem can be
seen easily from Eq. (14). Locations with high unobserved amenities zh
are more attractive than others. Since land rents Rh clear the market for
residential land at each location, the unobserved amenities zh and the
land rent function v(Rh) are positively correlated. Hence, the parameter
estimates will be biased. We solve this problem by applying the two-
step approach developed by Bayer et al. (2007). The first step (21)
rewrites the logit (14) as follows:
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The location-specific fixed effect Θh reflects the utility of location h for
the reference education group =s 2. It encompasses the endogenous
variable v(Rh) and unobserved amenities zh, thus allowing the other
parameters to be estimated consistently. The fixed effects Θh can be
estimated by contraction mapping. Note that while most of the pre-
ference parameters are estimated in deviations from the reference
group, the valuation of job availability μJs can be estimated in absolute
terms. This is due to the fact that gsh varies by education group. The
second step decomposes Θh by estimating (22); zh is the error term of
this regression model. We deal with the endogeneity of Rh by applying
an instrumental variables technique. We instrument Rh with fixed
characteristics (levels of amenities) of other locations that are close
substitutes to h in geographical space.
Finally, the transportation cost identity (6), =μ μ μ γ 1,Ks Js Ms s0 yields
an over-identifying restriction (Table 1, line 6). All parameters in this
condition have been estimated in previous lines of Table 1. Hence, this
condition provides three over-identifying constraints, one for each level
of education. As explained in Section 2.2 this over-identification result
has a straightforward economic interpretation. It ensures that an in-
dividual is indifferent between loosing one percent of income either via a
lower wage or via higher commuting cost. This ratio is pinned down
empirically by the estimated effects of the financial cost of commuting
and the land rents on the preferences over various home locations, and
hence by the parameter estimates of the home location logit derived from
the observed location behaviour, see Eq. (14). However, at the same time
the estimated effect of land rent on the demand for residential land as
derived from the observed demand for land must be equal to the esti-
mated effect of land rent on utility by Shephard’s lemma, see Eq. (19).
Both estimates are fully independent but should be consistent. Since there
is nothing in the estimation procedure that guarantees this consistency,
this condition provides an over-identification test. The assymptotic dis-
tribution of this test statistic is discussed in Appendix C.
4. Data
In the estimation of the modal split and job location logit we exploit
data on commuting from the 2004–2011 national travel survey for
the Netherlands (Mobiliteitsonderzoek Nederland MON 2004–2009
and Onderzoek Verplaatsingen in Nederland OVIN 2010–2011).
Respondents have been asked to report all their trips on a particular
Table 1
Identification of the parameters.
Model Equation Parameters Data/inputs Outputs
1. OLS land use (19) ρ, ψ R A W, ,h h h v(Rh)
2. Logit modal split (8) γs cshjm cshj
3. Logit job location (10) ysj, μMs cshj gsh
4. Logit home location,
first stage
(21) μJs gsh, ah μJsgsh
5. IV home location,
2nd stage
(22) αs, μKs μJsgsh, ah, v(Rh)
6. Transport cost
identity
(6) μKs γ0, μMs, μJs Over
identified
8 Lines 2 to 5 estimate sequentially the nested logit model describing the consumer
behaviour. This kind of estimation yields consistent estimates but is not efficient
(Train, 2009). We sacrifice some efficiency for the sake of convenience.
9 The average is taken over transport modes, where we use the probabilities
m shj j sh s hPr[ ]Pr[ ]Pr[ ] to calculate the expectation.
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day. The response rate varies between 55 and 82%. Table 2 reports the
data selection steps. From the respondents for whom home and job ZIP
codes are available,10 we select those aged between 18 and 65, not in
full time education, working for at least 12 hours per week. We drop
respondents for whom education level data are missing, with a home or
work address outside the Netherlands or on one of the islands in the
North Sea, those reporting a post-office box as work address, or having
made more than eight trips on the day of survey. We restrict the set of
commuting modes to four alternatives: car as a driver, train, bus/tram/
metro, bike/walk, deleting respondents commuting by other modes.
The remaining dataset is merged with data on travel times, costs and
distances for each commuting mode provided by the Dutch Ministry of
Transportation for every combination of home and job ZIP codes for
2004. Details of these travel data are discussed in Appendix D.
For the home logit estimations we exploit restricted access micro-
data of Statistics Netherlands on the residential locations and education
level of some 7.5 million Dutch workers. We also use data on amenities
from three sources. Data on the area of nature are derived from the
digital map “Land use” by Statistics Netherlands, year 2006. Data on
the accessibility of amenities are derived from the dataset “Proximity of
amenities” by Statistics Netherlands, year 2009. Data on the number of
monuments are derived from the “Register of monuments” by Cultural
Heritage Agency of the Netherlands.
Data on land prices have been calculated from microdata on housing
transactions provided by the Dutch Association of Real Estate Brokers
(NVM). The method for decomposing the value of the land and the
value of the construction is discussed in Appendix E. Land prices are
converted into land rents per working day using capital cost of 4.2% per
year and 228 working days per year.
Finally, the OLS income share of land exploits data on residential




Table 3 reports estimates of Eq. (19), see line 1 of Table 1. We es-
timate four specifications: (i) the equation in its original form and (ii)
with a quadratic term Rh2 added; (iii) the equation in its alternative
specification (20) and (iv) with a quadratic term added. In all specifi-
cations, the coefficients are highly significant. Fig. 3 reports the fit of
these four specifications. All four specifications fit the data well in the
intermediate segment of the land price distribution and in all four ψ is
positive. Hence, the elasticity of substitution between land use and
other consumption is less than one. When the quadratic term is added,
the slope of the original and the alternative specifications becomes very
similar. We conclude that the measurement error in Rh does not affect
our results much. However, specification (i) (the original Eq. (19)) has a
better fit in the right tail where land prices are high. In specification
(iii), the land share is higher than unity in some extreme cases. Since
these home locations in urban areas are important for our model, we
shall use specification (i) in what follows.
The elasticity of substitution implied by our estimates (see Eq. (7)) is
0.71 for the mean value of ln Rh. This is consistent with Albouy and
Ehrlich (2012) who report the elasticity of substitution between land
and the value of construction to be about one-half, using US data. One
would expect the land rent elasticity of the population density to be
higher than that of the intensity of construction, since people adjust
both the intensity of construction per unit of land and the use of con-
struction per person when the land rent is high. The predicted land
share in consumption varies from about 6% for the ZIP codes with the
lowest land rents to well above 50% for the most expensive ZIP codes.
5.2. Modal split
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the modal split logit, de-
scribed in line 2 of Table 1.11 Most variables are highly statistically
significant. Higher educated have a strong preference for commuting by
train or bike, holding other factors constant. Since the rail infra-
structure is better in cities, this contributes to an explanation of why
higher educated predominantly live and/or work in cities. Out-of-ve-
hicle time is valued more negatively than in-vehicle time for public
transport. Distance to a train station is valued negatively. A high degree
of urbanization leads to a higher preference for travelling by bus/tram/
metro. This might be related to the higher network quality and the
higher service frequency. The car is a land intensive mode of transport.
It is therefore less popular for consumers living in locations where land
is expensive. Finally, the parameter on the transport cost will be used in
the transport cost identify.
The implications of these estimation results are most easily judged
from the implied values of time, see Table 5. The compensating varia-
tion required to make people indifferent to a marginal increase in travel
time can be calculated as γs.time/γs0*Ws, where γs0∈ γs is the estimated
coefficient for the financial cost of commuting as a fraction of wage
income. The value of time is higher for higher educated workers, be-
cause they earn a higher wage. An hour spent riding a car or waiting for
the train is valued at the average wage rate in our data (18 euro for
high, 14 euro for medium, and 11 euro for low educated workers). Time
spent in train is less costly, while time spent waiting for a bus is more
costly.12
Parking costs are measured by including the land rent per square
meter relative to the wage at both the home and job location, Rj/Ws. A
higher parking cost lowers the probability of choosing a car. Let γsP be
the estimated coefficient on Rj/Ws and let Ap be the land use for
parking. Hence, the cost of parking relative to income is equal to
ApRj/Ws. The effect of the financial cost of commuting relative to in-
come is measured by the coefficient γs0, see Eq. (6). Hence
=γ A R W γ R W/ /s p j s sP j s0 and therefore =A γ γ/p sP s0: the ratio of both
parameters is an estimate of the square meters land used for parking.
This calculation yields a land use of 34m2 and 21m2 at the home and
the job location respectively. Land use for parking might not always be
adequately priced for the consumer, but one would expect land use to
adjust to its shadow price one way or the other, e.g. by the employer not
making parking space available. Since car use is land intensive due to
parking space, it is less popular in locations where land is expensive.
Table 2
Data selection.
# persons MON OVIN
2004–09 2010–11
Total respondents 310,003 84,339
Working with known home and job ZIP code 75,147 18,463
Selection on status and data availability (see text) 62,130 14,311
Restriction to car, train, bus/tram/metro, bike/walk 56,912 12,964
Travel data available and recorded correctly (see text) 53,842 12,003
Land rents at home & job location available 53,504 11,835
10 A four-digit ZIP code contains on average 2000 houses. In urban areas, a ZIP code
covers approximately a square kilometre.
11 We delete irrelevant alternatives, i.e.: (i) train if the total distance to transfer (home
+job) is larger than 40 km; (ii) bus/tram/metro if in-vehicle time is larger than 2 h or
out-of-vehicle time is larger than 1.5 h; (iii) bike if commuting distance is larger than
40 km, all for a single trip.
12 The values of time found for car and bus are somewhat higher, and the values of
time for train somewhat lower than those reported in the recent stated preferences study
for the Netherlands (Significance, 2013). The stated preferences values of time are
(averaged over education levels, and over in- and out-of-vehicle time): 9 euro/h car, 12
euro/h train and 8 euro/h bus.
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The difference in land use at the home and job location can either be
due to more efficient land use at the job location (e.g. parking garages)
or to the fact that most facilities at the job location are paid for from
pre-tax income while facilities at home are paid for from after tax in-
come.
5.3. Job location
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the job location logit
(described in line 3 in Table 1). Some 10% of the individuals work in
the same ZIP code as where they live. We have no data on these com-
mutes. We add a dummy for the average cost of intra ZIP code com-
muting. Since all parameters are education level specific, the model can
be estimated for each education level separately.
For medium and low educated workers the coefficient on general-
ized commuting cost (coefficient μMs in (10)) is larger than one, which is
inconsistent with the assumptions of a nested logit. An explanation
might be that commuting costs per mode are estimated with a fair
amount of measurement error for short commuting distances, because
within a ZIP code heterogeneity is ignored. This is consistent with the
fact that the coefficient is larger than 1 for the lower educated. Higher
educated commute longer distances and are therefore less vulnerable to
measurement error in short run commutes. We have experimented with
different specifications of the modal split model, but by and large this
does not change this outcome much. In what follows, we restrict μMs to
1, implicitly assuming a multinomial logit structure of the modal split
and job location choice.
5.4. Home location
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients from the first stage home
logit (21). The standard errors are clustered. The coefficients by job
availability indicate the weights people of education level s attach to
Table 3
Land use equation.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Parameter coef. t-value coef. t-value coef. t-value coef. t-value
ψ 14.195 (23.2) 37.837 (16.2) 123.293 (25.8) 172.694 (21.0)
ρ 0.058 (43.5) 0.039 (25.2) 0.018 (39.8) 0.016 (31.4)
2nd order term −1.716 (19.8) −6.894 (12.8)
R2 0.76 0.79 0.37 0.40



































































Fig. 3. Actual vs. predicted income share of land.
Table 4
Estimation results for the modal split model.
General variables coef t-val
Cost in % of net wage −12.24 (8.6)
Time (min/10) −0.261 (20.0)
Parking cost at homea −4.184 (15.8)
Parking cost at joba −2.543 (18.0)
Alternative specific variables Train Bus Bike
coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val
Intercept −1.574 (14.7) 0.029 (0.3) 0.622 (19.2)
High educated 0.578 (11.6) −0.003 (0.1) 0.527 (16.9)
Low educated −0.480 (6.7) 0.006 (0.1) −0.108 (3.4)
Distance home-transfer (km/10) −0.404 (9.7)
Distance job-transfer (km/10) −0.518 (7.8)
Urbanization at home location 0.258 (15.2)
Urbanization at job location 0.289 (17.0)
Δ time in vehicle (min/10) 0.177 (15.5) 0.071 (5.6) −0.190 (13.7)
Δ time out vehicle (min/10) 0.000 (0.0) −0.146 (4.8)
# observations 58778
a Measured as: land rent divided by the wage income, in %.
Table 5
The values of time (euro/h).
Education Low Middle High
Car time 12 14 19
In-vehicle time train 4 5 6
Out–of-vehicle time train 12 14 19
In-vehicle time bus 9 10 14
Out–of-vehicle time bus 18 22 29
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job availability gsh in their home location. These are the only coeffi-
cients estimated in levels. High educated are less sensitive to land rents.
Since land rents are higher in the city, this adds to the explanation why
high educated workers predominantly live in the city. Alternatively,
this result can be interpreted as saying that higher educated are pre-
pared to pay a higher premium for amenities of the city, such as an
environment with many monuments, the proximity of universities and
the availability of restaurants. Table 8 reports the estimation results of
the second step (22) (see line 5 in Table 1).
Our methodology allows to calculate the land rents that different
locations would command if their population consisted exclusively of
lower of high educated, respectively, as well as the contribution of job
availability and observed amenities to these rents. The calculation
proceeds as follows. We calculate the value of − +v R μ s h( ) ln Pr[ ]h Ks
for each ZIP code and then solve for lnRh. Fig. 4 provides a graphical
documentation of the results, using intervals of 0.40. The upper two
panels depict the calculated log land rent differentials for high and low
educated. The middle and lower panels show the valuation of job
availability and amenities, respectively, expressed in log land rents. The
relative contribution of job availability and amenities differs widely
between levels of education. For high educated, there is a much higher
variation in the attractivity of locations, both in terms of job availability
and in terms of amenities. This adds to the explanation of the spatial
segregation between high and low educated workers documented in
Fig. 2. Amenities contribute substantially to the popularity of cities as
an area to live in, in particular Amsterdam. The contribution of job
availability is spread out much more evenly among the central Western
part of the country.
5.5. Transport cost identity
The transport cost identity reads =μ μ μ γ 1Ks Js Ms s0 . All of its para-
meters have been estimated, so we can check whether this over-iden-
tifying restriction holds (see line 6 of Table 1). Table 9 reports the
transport cost identity calculation for the three education levels. The
over-identifying restrictions hold remarkably close.
6. Policy experiment
The city of Amsterdam is located just South of a major canal, con-
necting the Amsterdam harbour to the North Sea. The main connections
between Amsterdam and the area North of the canal consist of five
highway tunnels and two train tunnels. Fig. 5 illustrates the location of
the canal and the railway network in the region. The areas North and
South are indicated in dark pink respectively light pink. Since many
people commute from the North to jobs in Amsterdam and the neigh-
bouring municipality of Haarlemmermeer (the location of Schiphol
airport), this connection is important for the Dutch economy. As a
policy experiment, we consider what difference the availability of these
rail tunnels makes. We calculate a counterfactual in which the rail
tunnels are closed, so that no train connection is possible between
North and South, and compare it with the current equilibrium.
6.1. Framework for the welfare analysis
There are four types of agents in our model, three types of workers
differing by their level of education s and the class of absentee land-
lords. Landlords might be further subdivided in local subgroups, as we
will do in our empirical application. The effect of the change in trans-
port accessibility on the wealth of landlords Ql is equal to the sum of the
effect on land rents across all locations:
∑= −
∈






where the superscripts n and o refer to the new and the old equilibrium,
respectively. The effect on the utility of consumers with education level
s is derived from their expected utility, see Eq. (13). This general
equilibrium effect can be decomposed into four components:
(i) the effect of the change in the commuting cost for mode m for
people who actually use that mode;
(ii) the effect of people changing modes because the relative cost
have changed;
(iii) the effect of people changing jobs location because some jobs
have become more easily accessible;
(iv) the effect of people changing their home location because lo-
cations change in their relative attractivity.
The expression for the calculation of these components are pre-
sented in Table 10. They follow from Eqs. (8) to (13). For example, for
the sum of effect (i)–(iii):
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other effects are derived similarly. All effects are expressed in terms of
money equivalents by multiplying them by the average wage Ws for
education level s.
Note that the calculation of the first three components in Table 10
Table 6
Estimation results for the job location logit.
Education Low Middle High
coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val
Free estimation of the coefficient on generalized commuting cost:
Generalized commuting
cost
1.261 (225.2) 1.187 (296.8) 0.992 (247.5)
Dummy home=job ZIP −0.128 (4.7) −0.282 (11.3) −0.373 (11.3)
The coefficient on generalized commuting cost constrained to unity:
dummy home=job ZIP 0.567 (25.0) 0.233 (11.1) −0.398 (13.2)
# observations 17151 26189 21999
Table 7
Home location choice, first stage.
Education level Low Middle High
Variable coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val
Job availability (level) 0.627 (10.6) 0.438 (7.4) 0.423 (6.7)
Transformed land rent 2.971 (11.7) −2.422 (8.5)
# monum.1km/1000 −0.135 (1.3) −0.071 (0.7)
# monum.1-5km/1000 −0.021 (0.7) 0.020 (0.8)
Share nature within 5km 0.097 (1.6) 0.347 (4.9)
dum. university in 10km −0.007 (0.4) 0.133 (6.0)
# restaurants 1km/100 −0.349 (3.7) 0.100 (1.0)
# restaurants 1-5km/100 0.063 (3.7) −0.021 (1.4)
# observations 2753 2753 2753
Table 8
Home location choice, second stage, IV.
Education level Middle
variable coef t-val
Transformed land rent 6.795 (21.4)
# monum.1km/1000 0.399 (9.2)
# monum.1-5km/1000 0.094 (7.7)
share nature within 5km −0.024 (0.6)
dum. university in 10km −0.065 (3.3)
# restaurants 1km/100 0.437 (7.4)
# restaurants 1-5km/100 0.051 (5.2)
Intercept −8.264 (110.7)
# observations 2753
First stage F-value 198
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does not require the calculation of the new equilibrium. However, when
considering the relocation of people between residential locations h we
have to solve for changes in the number of houses Nh and land rents Rh
for each location h. This requires finding a solution to a system of 2H
simultaneous equations. This system is solved by starting with a vector
of land rents for each h, calculating Nh from the system of Eq. (18), and
then calculating the demand for land at each location from Eq. (17). For
those locations where demand exceeds supply Ah, the land rent is in-
creased and the other way around. This algorithm converges to an
equilibrium.




















































































































































































































































































Fig. 4. Value of the location, job availability and observed amenities, expressed in terms of log land price differentials. Low educated left, high educated right. (In all panels, by
normalization, 0 corresponds to a location in Enschede with an average land price of 109 euro/m2.)
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6.2. Results
The model and the expressions in Table 10 are applied to a policy
experiment, using the parameter values estimated in Section 5. We
compare the counterfactual equilibrium to the current equilibrium.
Table 11 describes the relocation of economic activity between the
regions North and South of the canal due to the availability of the
tunnels. The better connection of the less productive region North of the
canal to the vibrant metropolitan area around Amsterdam leads to a
relocation of jobs from the North to the South. The number of jobs in
the North declines by 3%. Some 33,000 workers commute by train from
the North to the South; 80% are additional commuters. Fig. 6 docu-
ments the job relocation process. However, the lower concentration of
jobs in the North comes along with a higher quality of living, as can be
seen from the increase in land prices in the North in particular along the
railway corridors (see Fig. 7). Higher land prices lead to a lower land
use per worker. Hence, the total population in the North goes up. Since
Amsterdam is particularly attractive as a job location for higher edu-
cated and since higher educated prefer travelling by train, the main part
of the population increase are higher educated, their population being
7% higher due to the availability of the tunnels. The analysis shows that
a new commuting link may lead to a flight of jobs from the periphery,
but also to an increase in the price of residential land by making the
region a more attractive residential area, especially along the railways
and in particular for higher educated.
In our framework transport infrastructure affects welfare through
two channels: changes in population composition and changes in land
use intensity. This policy experiment illustrates the interaction between
the two mechanisms. Improved rail accessibility of the North attracts
new, mostly high educated, population to the region (first mechanism).
It is efficient that the newcomers live next to the railway stations as
they value their proximity the most. This requires, however, adjust-
ments in land use (second mechanism), as the newcomers also have
other land consumption preferences than the incumbents. Stated dif-
ferently, investments in local public goods may fail to generate the
Table 9
Transport cost identity.
s μKs t-val μJs t-val μMs t-val γs0 t-val Product St.err.
1 0.102a (17.1)a 0.627 (10.6) 1 ∞ 12.24 (8.6) 0.78 (0.27)
2 0.147a (21.4)a 0.438 (7.4) 1 ∞ 12.24 (8.6) 0.79 (0.30)
3 0.228a (7.3)a 0.423 (6.7) 0.992 (247.5) 12.24 (8.6) 1.17 (0.41)





Fig. 5. North Sea canal area.
Table 10
Decomposition of the general equilibrium effect per persona.
Effect Equation Expression
Users of mode m (4)





























a All probabilities are evaluated in the old equilibrium.
Table 11
Residents, job, and commuting North and South, in thousands.
Tunnels: No Yes
Low Middle High Total Low Middle High Total
residents:
North 126 183 169 478 128 190 181 499
South 171 270 378 819 171 270 377 818
jobs:
North 109 147 135 391 106 143 131 380
South 206 341 443 989 210 350 453 1013
Commuting:
North–South 24 43 42 109 28 53 55 136
train 0 0 0 0 5 12 16 33
car 19 35 35 89 18 33 33 84
South–North 8 11 14 33 8 11 16 35
Train 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.6 1 2
Car 7 10 13 30 7 10 13 30
North–North 98 132 115 345 95 126 108 329




































Fig. 6. Jobs flight to highly productive job locations South of the canal.
C.N. Teulings et al. Journal of Urban Economics 103 (2018) 67–82
78
expected benefits if they do not go hand in hand with redevelopment of
the housing stock.
Table 12 reports the welfare gains from the tunnels. The benefits are
distributed unevenly among education levels: high skilled individuals
benefit more, since they have the highest preference for commuting by
train and the most to gain from being able to commute to the vibrant
Amsterdam economy with its wide availability of high paying jobs.
Their benefits are three times as large as the benefits of middle edu-
cated and ten times larger than the gains of low educated individuals.
The net welfare benefits for the landowners are relatively small: land-
owners in North and South gain, landowners elsewhere loose. This is
due to the greater attractivity of the North for living, which reduces the
demand for land elsewhere in the country. The table also shows that
land owners cannot expropriate the total benefits from the public good.
This is in line with Kuminoff and Pope (2014) and Bayer et al. (2007)
who report a wedge between the capitalization effect and the total
welfare effect of a policy measure. This effect arises due to changes in
hedonic schedule caused by relocation of people and can be very sub-
stantial, as illustrated by our counterfactual example.
The direct gain via the modal split makes up for about two thirds of
the total welfare gain, while job relocation accounts for a quarter.
Although the home relocation effect and the effect for landowners are
relatively small in total, they are very important for the distribution of
the gains. The land owners transfer part of their benefits to consumers.
This result arises because the new transport connection relaxes the
tense land market in Amsterdam leading to lower land rents there. High
educated benefit most from moving to the North, their benefits from
home relocation are therefore the largest. Low and middle educated
gain much less because they derive little benefit from the new infra-
structure while they face higher land rents due to high educated
workers driving up land rents at locations close to stations.
7. Conclusion
We have developed and estimated a structural spatial general
equilibrium model for the valuation of the effects of investments in
public goods on home and job location choice and land use. Our results
suggest that ignoring the changes in the intensity of land use and re-
location of people with different education levels misses important
determinants of the size and distribution of welfare gains from infra-
structural investments. As a policy experiment we calculated the wel-
fare benefits of two railway tunnels connecting Amsterdam to the re-
gion North of the city. The direct effect of the tunnels on the travel
times and modal split ignores up to 30% of the total general equilibrium
effect. These wider gains come together with increases in the popula-
tion density and the share of high educated in the North, due to better
job market access. The benefits of the railway tunnels are distributed
highly unequally across education levels, the gains for high educated
being ten times larger than for low educated. This unequal distribution
of benefits poses a challenge for the political economy of investments in
public goods and specifically transport infrastructure. Considerable
changes in land use intensity and population composition show that
large investments in public goods should be accompanied by land re-
development. Keeping housing supply fixed prohibits the efficient use
of new infrastructure by population groups who value it most and leads
to foregone benefits.
Our model focusses on some main mechanisms through which in-
vestments in public goods affect the intensity of land use and the
composition of population. This allows to keep the analysis tractable.
We do not account for the option of transferring land from agricultural
to residential use. Similarly, we do not allow local wages or the local
supply of amenities to be adjusted to changes in the structure of the
economy. Ignoring these margins of adjustment leads to an under-
estimation of the benefits of public goods. Furthermore, there is no
feedback of changes in modal split on travel times. For example, if the
closure of the railway tunnels were to lead to a massive increase in car
traffic, that would increase travel times for these trips. However, travel
times are treated as exogenous in our application. This also leads to an
underestimation of the benefits. Since travel by car did not massively
increase in our policy experiment, this does not substantially affect our
conclusions. Finally, we have studied preference heterogeneity between
three education levels. Our framework can easily be extended to more
socioeconomic groups, e.g. males versus females, singles versus cou-
ples, yielding new interesting insights.













































Fig. 7. Higher land prices and higher population North of canal.
Table 12
Decomposition welfare effects, in mln euros.
Effect Education level Land owners Total
Low Middle High North South Elsewhere
Modal split 151 470 1329 1950
Job relocation 51 183 578 812
Home relocation 13 43 183 239
Land owners 1659 −188 −1570 −99
Total 215 696 2090 1659 −188 −1570 2902
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Appendix A. Derivation of the indirect utility function
The first-order conditions of the maximization problem in Eq. (1) yield expressions for L B*, *,i i and C*i as a function of Rh conditional on x. For
example, for L *i we obtain:
̂=L R x L R W x* ( ; ) *( ) ( ),i h h i
where ̂L R*( )h is the optimal land consumption per unit of income. The individual specific term χi(x) drops out due to the multiplicative specification
of the utility function. The effects of the take home payWi(x) can be factored out since the utility function is homothetic and the production function
of housing services features constant returns to scale. We omit the prices of other consumption and building as formal arguments, since these are
constant across locations. We can write similar functions for B *i and C*i . Substitution of these demand functions for L, B and C in the utility function
Ui(·) yields an expression for the indirect utility function Vi(Rh; x) of the form given in Eq. (3), where we use = −W x W e( )i s w j c x( ) ( )s i and where
̂≡v R U F L R B R C R( ) ln [ [ *( ), *( )], *( )]h h h h is a twice differentiable function. Since dU(·)/dRh < 0 and >d U dR(·)/ 0,h2 2 the function v(Rh) must satisfy
< ′′ > − ′′v R v R v R( ) 0, ( ) ( )h h h 2. Since Wi(x) is the cost to an individual of acquiring a utility level =V V R x( ; ),i h the cost function C(·) that goes with
this indirect utility function reads:
= − − =C R V V v R χ x W x( ; ) exp[ ( ) ( )] ( ).h h i i
By Shephard’s lemma the demand for land is the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to the price of land:
= = − ′L R x C R V v R W x* ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ).i h R h h i (23)
The full cost function includes as arguments the prices of both land and all other expenditure. Since a cost function is homogeneous of degree one
in prices, we can write
= = − −− −C R P V PC P R V PV v P R χ x( , ; ) ( , 1; ) exp[ ( ) ( )],h h h i1 1
which is equal to the expression in the text for the normalization =P 1. The derivatives reads
= − ′ − − = − ′
= + ′ − − = + ′





− − − −
=
C v P R V v P R χ x v R C
C P R v P R V v P R χ x R v R C
C P R v P R v P R V v P R χ x R v R v R C
( ) exp[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ,
[1 ( )] exp[ ( ) ( )] [1 ( )] ,
[ ( ) ( )] exp[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( ) ] .
R h h i P h
P h h h i P h h





2 1 2 1 1
1
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The absolute value of the elasticity of substitution η between land and all other expenditure (building plus other consumption) can be calculated
as (see Lau, 1976):













leaving out the argument(s) of the functions C and v and where the subscripts R of C denote the relevant partial derivatives.
Appendix B. The error structure of the model
The terms ɛ , ɛ , ɛ , ɛ ,͠ikjm ikjM ikj ikW and ɛ͠ik are individual specific random effects which follow a type I extreme value distribution with zero mean and
variance π2/6. The error terms εikjM and εikW are defined by
≡ − ′ + +
≡ − + −
γ c c
y μ c g
ɛ max[ ɛ ] ,






sj Ms shj ikj sh (25)





ɛ ɛ ɛ ,
ɛ ɛ ɛ .
͠
͠
ikj ikj Ms ikjM
ik ik Js ikW (26)
where ɛ͠ikj and εikjM are uncorrelated and where ɛ͠ik and εikW are uncorrelated. Usually, the parameter μKs can be normalized to unity without loss of
generality. This is not the case in our model due to the land rent function v(Rh) and due to the interpretation of ln Vi(Rh; x) as a log cost function, such
that = − ′L v R W x( ) ( ),i h i
* see Eq. (23). Since ɛ , ɛ ,͠ikjm ikj and ɛ͠ik follow a type I extreme value distribution, the choice problems in Eqs. (8) and (10) are
described by a logit model, see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), Waddell (1993), Cardell (1997), and Train (2009).
Appendix C. Standard error in the transport cost identity
The estimation error of the left hand side of Eq. (6) is obtained by observing that the error terms in the various submodels that identify each of
these parameters are independent: εikjm for the estimation of γs0, see Eq. (8); εikj for μMs, see Eq. (10); εik for μJs, see Eq. (14); and zh for μKs, see
Eq. (15). A first order expansion of the variance of a product of independent random variable satisfies
≅ +XY Y X X YVar[ ] E [ ]Var[ ] E [ ]Var[ ],2 2





≅ + + +
= + + +
− − − −
− − − −
μ μ μ γ μ μ μ μ μ μ γ γ
t μ t μ t μ t γ
Var[ ] Var[ ] Var[ ] Var[ ] Var[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
Ks Js Ms s Ks Ks Js Js Ms Ms s s









where we use ̂ ̂≡t μ μ μ( ) / Var[ ] ,Ks Ks Ks where ̂t μ( )Ks is the t-statistic of ̂μKs. For ̂μ ,Ks we estimate −̂μKs1 and −̂t μ( )Ks1 . Since
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≅ ′ ⇒
≅ = ⇒ ≅− − − − −
f X f X X
X X X X t X t X t X
Var[ ( )] (E[ ]) Var[ ]
Var[ ] E [ ]Var [ ] E [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ),
2
1 4 2 2 1
where we use E ≅−X[ ]1 E− X[ ]1 in the final step. The assymptotic t-statistic of X is equal to the assumptotic t-statistic of −X 1. Like the standard errors for
the coefficients of the nested logit models, this expression for the standard error does not account for the estimation error of coefficients estimated in
early stages. Hence, it is a lower bound of the true standard error.
Appendix D. Data
Travel times by car are reported for the morning peak hour between 7 and 9 a.m. When multiple routes are possible, travel times, costs and
distances are calculated as averages over all possible routes, weighted by the number of commuters using each route. The cost of car travel has been
set at 0.3 euro for every kilometer traveled plus toll costs.13 Travel times by train and bus/tram/metro are split up between in- and out-of-vehicle
times. Travel costs for the train have been provided by the Ministry of Transportation; travel costs for bus/tram/metro are calculated from the
number of urban transit zones traveled.14 Biking and walking travel times are calculated by using the travel distances calculated for car trips,
assuming an average speed of 16km/h. The costs of these trips are set equal to zero. We deleted implausible observations, e.g. for which the actually
chosen travel mode is characterized by very large or very small travel times and/or distances (below the 2.5 or above the 97.5 percentile for the
mode concerned), or home-work distances smaller than the home-work straight line.
Table 13 presents the descriptive statistics of the mode choice by education level. Table 14 presents the summary statistics for the amenity
variables and for land prices.
Appendix E. Calculation of land rents
We calculate land rents for some 4000 four digit zip codes in the Netherlands using the hedonic price methodology. We exploit unique geo-
referenced microdata on more than 1 million housing sale transactions 1985–2007 provided by the Dutch Organization of Real Estate Brokers
(NVM). The NVM covers 70–80% of all housing transactions on average, with urban regions being somewhat overrepresented and peripheral regions
being somewhat underrepresented. For each house the NVM documents a range of structural characteristics including land lot size, living space, type
of house (terraced, corner, semi-detached, etc.), presence of a garage or own parking space, presence of central heating, the year of construction, etc.
We estimate the following regression model (see Glaeser et al., 2005; Davis and Heathcote, 2007; and Davis and Palumbo, 2008, Groot, 2011):
∑ ∑ ∑= + + + +
= = =











where Pijt is the price of house i in area j at time t, Lijt stands for the lot size, and the X’s are house characteristics that we control for. The key
parameters of interest are the βj’s. These capture the share of land in the total transaction price. We allow βj to vary over four-digit zip codes; in urban
areas these zip codes cover one squared kilometer. Note that = =β dlnP dlnL L P/ /j ijt ijt ijt ijt ·dPijt/dLijt. Since dPijt/dLijt is the marginal effect of an
additional square meter of land on the transaction price, it can be interpreted as the marginal price of land. Therefore βj is the share of land in the
housing price. Using this information, the price of land per square meter can be easily derived as βj ·Pijt/Lijt. We correct for overall price increases by
adding the time dummies.
Table 13
Descriptive statistics for commuting data, by day.
Mode Car Train Bus Bike, walk
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Modal share 0.71 0.05 0.03 0.21
Distance, km 44.7 (36.9) 87.9 (47.4) 29.9 (19.2) 11.6 (7.2)
Duration, min 48.9 (30.0) 143.6 (42.4) 85.9 (34.4) 43.4 (27.0)
Cost, euro 6.8 (5.4) 6.8 (3.3) 3.7 (1.5) 0
Table 14
Descriptive statistics on land prices, and amenities by ZIP code.
Variable Mean St.dev.
ln daily land rent −3.689 0.901
# monuments within 1km/1000 0.032 0.161
# monuments 1 to 5km/1000 0.284 0.779
share nature within 5km 0.127 0.114
dummy university 10km 0.269 0.444
# restaurants within 1km/100 0.054 0.159
# restaurants 1 to 5km/100 0.634 1.507
13 This includes fuel, amortization, insurance, maintenance, and taxes for a car in a medium-price range, using a gasoline price of € 1.25 per l or € 0.10 per km for 2005 and of € 1.78
per l or € 0.15 per km for 2012 (http://www.autoweek.nl/kostenberekening.php?id=35685amp;jaar=2005).
14 Cost = € 0.43 times the number of urban transit zones plus one.
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